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Background: The preventative paradigm of preconception care is receiving increasing attention, yet its boundaries
remain vague in three respects: temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. Crucially, it remains unclear just who is to
be considered a ‘potential parent’, how soon they should take up preconception responsibilities, and how weighty
their responsibilities should be.
Discussion: In this paper, we argue that a normal potential parent of reasonable prudence has a moral duty to
adequately optimize the conditions under which she or his reproductive partner will conceive, though a
proportionality calculus calls for toleration of several forms of preconception behaviour that are non-ideal
from the perspective of reproductive risk. We distinguish between five categories of potential parents to which
different duties of preconception care should be ascribed. This framework is advanced to assign preconception
care responsibilities with more precision than is often done in the current debate on preconception care. We
conclude by applying our theoretical framework to three types of preconception care interventions: consumption
of folic acid; keeping one’s weight under control; and engaging in preconception genetic screening. Our analysis
shows that the literature on preconception care often glosses over crucial distinctions between different types of
potential parents and uses a notion of preconception beneficence that may be overly demanding. Nevertheless,
preconception moral duties will often be weighty and reluctance to accept such duties on account of the burden
they impose do not warrant preconception insouciance.
Summary: To avoid misplaced responsibility ascriptions in the growing field of preconception care, distinctions
must be made between different types of potential parents to whom different degrees of preconception
responsibility apply. We present such a preliminary framework and bring it to bear on the cases of folic acid
consumption, obesity and genetic testing.
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According to the Health Council of The Netherlands,
‘preconception care’ (henceforth PCC) refers to the large
cluster of interventions “aimed at ensuring that couples
who wish to have children start a pregnancy under the
best possible conditions” [1]. Though clearly demarcated* Correspondence: pieter.bonte@ugent.be
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orat one end by the occurrence of conception, at the other
end the boundaries of PCC can be vague in three respects:
temporally; agentially; and instrumentally. Temporally,
the concept of PCC can be understood to refer to all
acts and omissions which might affect the good of
future persons, which at the extreme include the acts
and omissions of distant ancestors. Agentially, PCC can
refer to a broad array of agents from ‘potential parents’
and all the subcategories thereof (see below) over myriad
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stretched to include not only specific medical interven-
tions and family planning but all kinds of acts and
omissions that are instrumental in creating the best
possible (or at least minimally decent) conditions in
which to conceive future persons.
In this paper, we start by briefly sketching a variety of
PCC measures that contemporary potential parents could
engage in, thereby giving an idea of the large number of
options currently available to conceive under optimal or
minimally decent conditions. Second, we seek to provide a
categorization of the ethically relevant types of ‘potential
parents’. Third, we develop a normative argument about
what the ethical principles of beneficence and nonmalefi-
cence demand of potential parents. Finally, we apply
the resulting general conception of potential parents’
preconception responsibilities to three cases: consump-
tion of folic acid; avoidance of obesity; and undergoing
screening for genetic risk.Discussion
What can potential parents do?
The PCC-armoury available today contains a wide range
of sufficiently effective, evidence-based interventions for
potential parents to merit considering them [1]. For the
purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to give an idea of
the demands that a fully-fledged PCC regime would put
on potential parents. They would be asked to: (1) follow a
number of specific dietary prescriptions; (2) take specific
supplements; (3) avoid obesity and anorexia; (4) moderate
or abstain from use of alcohol, tobacco, and various other
recreational drugs; (5) avoid specific environmental expo-
sures and chemicals; (6) avoid excessive psychological
stress; (7) take specific precautionary measures in case of
maternal health problems or when taking certain forms of
medication prior to conception; (8) avoid consanguinity
and (in case of suspected significant risk) undergo genetic
screening and, if necessary, take appropriate measures,
such as using assisted reproduction techniques, choosing
a different reproductive partner or abstaining from
reproduction; and last but not least (9) time conception
at an ‘optimal age’ via contraception and other means
of family planning.
In regions with well developed health care systems, the
incidence of many forms of adverse pregnancy outcomes
has decreased dramatically throughout the 20th and
early 21st Century. However, as the latest March of Dimes
Global Report on Birth Defects shows, the incidence
of birth defects remains considerable everywhere [2].
According to this report, worldwide, approximately 8
million children per year were born with a serious birth
defect of genetic or partially genetic origin – i.e. 6 per cent
of all births. In France, the country for which the Marchof Dimes reported the smallest number of birth defects,
there were still 39.7 children per 1000 live births born
with a serious congenital abnormality. Around the globe,
human reproduction remains far from risk-free, and
intensified PCC is one promising avenue to reduce
human suffering. Moreover, the case for intensified
PCC gains all the more urgency if one factors in the
number of abortions which often entail psychological
damage, physical pain, and also grave health risks to
the mother when sub-optimally performed [3]. Many
of these risks could have been avoided by better access
to and use of contraceptives or by the adoption of
additional PCC measures to improve the timing of the
pregnancy and the viability and health of the child [3].
Who is a ‘potential parent’?
A contemporary potential parent may be confronted with
her or his (alleged) PCC responsibilities by at least three
groups:
a) public health and child care providers who seek to
enlist potential parents in their respective projects,
as well as personal health care providers who
provide directive counselling;
b) private for-profit providers of PCC interventions,
such as direct-to-consumer genetic screening and
counselling companies who have a commercial
interest in creating demand for their services; and
c) particular moral communities (e.g. anti-abortion
activists) who hold moral views that prescribe duties
of PCC to potential parents.
However, it is often unclear exactly who these groups
are targeting. At times, only prospective parents are being
addressed (for instance in the above characterization of
PCC by the Health Council of The Netherlands). At other
times, the category of addressees is expanded to include
everyone who is (presumably) fertile or is nearing fertility
(see for example the recent proposal by the UK Human
Genetics Commission to offer genetic screening during
the final years of secondary education [4]). This shows that
many different types of ‘potential parent’ can be identified
to which very different degrees of responsibility might
apply. In this section, we outline a categorization of
potential parents in which a balance has been struck
between precision and practicability. Our categorization
roughly follows the lines of probability and intention to
conceive, where ‘probability’ includes (presumed) capacity
as well as behaviour. Despite first appearances, it does not
necessarily reflect a linear temporal order. We distinguish
the following five categories:
1) Prepubertals nearing fertility (no capacity, no
behaviour, no intention).
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non-coitally) (capacity, no behaviour, no intention).
3) Sexually active persons with no intention to conceive
in the foreseeable future (capacity, behaviour, no
intention). This category also includes persons who
are duly compliant in their use of contraceptives, but
whose contraceptives are not fully reliable.
4) Sexually active persons with an unclear intention,
who wilfully abstain from contraception and leave it
to chance/nature whether conception will occur or
not (capacity, behaviour, intention unclear).
5) Prospective parents: fertile, sexually active persons who
intend to conceive in the foreseeable future (capacity,
behaviour, intention). This category also includes
persons using assisted reproductive technologies.
Bearing these distinctive categories of potential parents in
mind will help to avoid making category mistakes such as
lumping together too many different types of potential par-
ents when ascribing preconception duties of care to them
and expecting them to meet those duties (possibly backed
up with sanctions if they do not). However, in some forms
of PCC awareness-raising, there may be good reasons to
lump all potential parents together. For instance, one power-
ful argument for a non-stop stance of PCC prudence (for all
potential parents) is the high incidence of unintended and
ill-planned pregnancies. On some estimates, unintended
pregnancies alone amount to 41% of pregnancies world-
wide and remain prevalent in developed regions [3]. In-
deed, in the categorization outline above, unplanned or
ill-planned conception might occur in all groups who
have the capacity to conceive and are sexually active.
What should potential parents do?
The question arises, however, as to what constitutes ‘good
planning’, and to what extent and on which grounds
this can be morally demanded of potential parents. One
possible ground is a duty of beneficence, i.e. a duty to
advance the good (of others), often by active intervention
[5]. Such a duty can be said to hold if not generally, then
at least for persons with specific relational roles, such
as a parent towards his or her (future) child. Referring
to the work of Derek Parfit, Savulescu and Kahane observe
that “in selecting a more advantaged child we are also
bringing a different person into existence”. This poses a
‘non-identity problem’ as to “what might ground a moral
obligation or reason to select such a child”. They go on to
argue that one can nevertheless maintain the case for a
moral obligation of procreative beneficence, for instance
on impersonal grounds. As such, the reason to be benefi-
cent “is that selecting the most advantaged child would
make the outcome better, even if it is not better for the
child created” [9: 277]. To illustrate with an abstracted
clear-cut case with all other things being equal, if onecan either put a ‘bundle of joy’ or a ‘bundle of suffering’
on the planet, there would be a strong moral obligation to
conceive a joyous rather than a tormented child [9: 279].
Another possible ground is a duty of nonmaleficence, a
duty not to harm others, often by passive abstention [5]. Non-
maleficence will often be less demanding than beneficence,
but on the other hand it may be demanded of more persons,
for instance universally and not only of those standing in
some specific relational role. If some potential parent would
only have to be nonmaleficent in relation to her potential fu-
ture child, more leeway should be given to her own right to
autonomy: she should then be free to live her life as she sees
fit without being duty-bound to procure the good (for some-
one else). She should only refrain from harming others.
Preconception beneficence - above all, do good towards
one’s potential child?
Many contemporary ethicists would argue that the prime
focus of reproductive decision making should be the well-
being of the resultant child. To engage in PCC from the
motive of unburdening or strengthening society or of satis-
fying the parents’ instrumental plans with regard to the
child would be open to the same criticisms that have pro-
foundly discredited the eugenic reproductive schemes
prevalent from the end of the 19th Century up to the late
mid-20th Century [6,7].
Having regard to prioritizing the child’s wellbeing,
Savulescu and Kahane defend the following ‘principle
of procreative beneficence’ (PB, first coined in [8]):
“If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to
have a child, and selection is possible, then they have
a significant moral reason to select the child, of the
possible children they could have, whose life can be
expected, in light of the relevant available
information, to go best or at least not worse than any
of the others” [9: 274].
Although the use of the phrase ‘procreative beneficence’
seems to suggest a principle relevant to all procreative is-
sues, Savulescu and Kahane formulate the principle in a
highly targeted way. For instance, they note that: “PB is si-
lent on a number of further questions in procreative ethics
[. For instance it] assumes that a decision to have a child
has been taken.” [9: 274, footnote 3]. Their discussion is
also focused on settings involving selection, in which one
can make a choice between different gametes or embryos.
Within the bounds of these constraints, Savulescu and
Kahane have made a forceful argument that PB operates
as a primary moral principle which will often override
other principles in play such as procreative autonomy. In
brief, they argue that procreative autonomy allows for par-
ents to intentionally create a child who, for example, “will
live a brief life of misery and torment” [9: 279] even when
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Savulescu and Kahane find such parental autonomy morally
unacceptable as well as in violation of much common sense
morality. That said, they do allow for parental autonomy to
possibly remain a primary legal right. Moreover, they hold
that, other things being equal, PB entails maximizing paren-
tal commitment to provide the best chance for the best pos-
sible life. Less far-reaching aims such as a ‘life worth living’
or a ‘disease and handicap-free life’ will not do.
In this article, we will not contest Savulescu and
Kahane’s formulation of the principle, nor their applica-
tion of it. Rather, we will take their principle as-is but
remove the restriction of its application to prospective
parents so as to find out what it would imply if applied
in the preceding domains of preconception care. Rather
than taking on board the additional question of ‘enhance-
ment’ as Savulescu and Kahane do, in order to retain
focus, we will not contest the conventional ethico-medical
standard that the best condition to provide for future
children does not go beyond a ‘normal’ state of disease-
and handicap-free existence. As we do not provide a
justification for a principle of PB, those who deny the
existence of such a principle may also find our extension
of that principle unconvincing. Alternatively, our exten-
sion of the PB principle may make the account offered by
Savulescu and Kahane more compelling for some.
Interestingly, preconception care advocacy often (impli-
citly) appeals to PB, and this may corroborate Savulescu
and Kahane’s assertion that PB has substantial common-
sensical appeal. Nevertheless, we will argue that, in the
domain of PCC, PB runs up against formidable competing
concerns. This may be sufficient to cast significant doubt
on the thesis that PB can play the role of ‘first principle’ in
PCC. If this holds, contemporary PCC advocacy may need
to fundamentally rethink certain awareness-raising cam-
paigns and PCC counsellors their counselling practice.
To apply Savulescu and Kahane’s PB in the field of PCC,
it would need to be rephrased along the following lines to
constitute a ‘principle of preconception beneficence’:
“If one can take/refrain from action prior to conception to,
in light of the relevant available information, significantly
increase the likelihood that if one conceives it will be of a
child whose life can be expected to go best or at least not
worse than the lives of any of the other children one
may otherwise conceive, then one has a significant
moral reason to take/refrain from such action”.
If this would be the moral standard prescribed for all
potential parents, they would have to face up to a long
and taxing PCC checklist that will only lengthen as science
and technology increase the range of preconception options
that may serve to optimize reproductive outcomes. More-
over, persons at an ever-widening distance (in time or inintent) from conception may find themselves being drawn
into the expanding sphere of PCC responsibility. Given that
for instance the California Preconception Initiative advocates
that women be made aware of PCC at every medical visit
throughout the health care system, following the dictum
“every woman, every time” [9], they might have to answer at
every turn why they are not doing all they can, as soon as they
can, to ensure that, should there be any future pregnancy, it
will be a “pregnancy under the best possible conditions” [1].
The practical burden of long-term compliance with a
complex set of prescriptions to ensure a good that may
be very distant and/or improbable, is not to be underes-
timated. As Singh and colleagues write on the specific
topic of contraceptive use:
“By the time she is in her mid-40s, a woman with two
children will have spent, on average, only five years try-
ing to become pregnant, actually being pregnant and
not being at risk for another pregnancy for a few
months following a birth. To successfully avoid becom-
ing pregnant before, after or between those two births,
either she will have had to refrain from having sex, or
she or her partner will have had to practice contracep-
tion effectively for an average of about 25 years—a hard
standard of behaviour to live up to, even for the most
disciplined and highly motivated individuals” [3].
Although the use of contraceptives has by now (in the
developed world at least) become a more or less accepted
responsibility for the majority of sexually active persons,
for all its blessings the effort of maintaining adequate
compliance remains a substantial burden. To this burden,
the PCC armoury invites us to add staying informed and
up-to-date about the state-of-the-PCC-art, maintaining
dietary and physical exercise routines, avoiding certain
environments and toxins, undertaking medical screenings
and check-ups, securing adequate rearing-resources
(not only financial and material but also psychological,
pedagogical, social and cultural) prior to conception, etc.
The mere (potential) availability of some effective PCC
intervention is sufficient to impel a person to justify (if not
to others, then at least to herself) why she would not make
use of it. This can be experienced as a ‘technological impera-
tive’, or more generally, as a ‘capability imperative’: as soon
as some newfound mode of intervention is made available,
one’s sphere of possible agency is expanded, and one in-
escapably finds oneself at liberty to influence states of affairs
where one used to be factually impotent to do so. Any new-
found power thus puts us at liberty to either use or not use
it, thereby literally forcing a new responsibility on us.
As PCC advocates now call for pervasive and perpetual
awareness-raising programs aimed at all potential parents
[10], the risk arises that an increasing number of people
become susceptible to criticism of being or having been a
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and its availability expand, people become susceptible to
such criticism to an increasing degree.
From the vantage point of preventative health care, there
are good reasons to start assuming responsibilities of PCC
as soon as one nears reproductive age. For instance, many
of the effective PCC interventions are lifestyle and work
environment changes, and such changes are only likely to
have sufficient effect by the time conception occurs if
they take place well before conception [1]. In a similar
vein, lifestyle habits engaged in during one’s twenties
are likely to become entrenched ways of living for the
rest of one’s life, and altering one’s habits in later years
is likely to require greater effort. Thus, as many may
fail to muster sufficient intrinsic motivation to develop
healthy habits and make healthy choices because the
(moral) gratification is too uncertain and/or too remote,
they may need to be prodded and incentivized by others
in sufficiently early, constant and intensive ways.
A telling example of such a hands-on incentivizing
campaign is the ‘Don’t U Dare’ PCC promotional video of
the March of Dimes foundation [11]. In this promotional
video in the scripted reality format, a PCC coach closely
monitors a ‘merely fertile’ woman (category 3) and (cheer-
ily) chides her for every suboptimal move she makes.
Despite its superficial cheerfulness, this awareness-raising
material seems saturated in an emotionally manipulative
discourse of shaming and blaming and may therefore
amount to a form of PCC counselling that is highly
directive. Much the same seems to hold for the nation-
wide ‘Show Your Love’ campaign of the US Preconception
Health and Health Care Initiative and the California
Preconception Initiative, which suggests to potential
parents that if one does not engage in PCC, one may
be lacking basic parental love [12].
In a more comprehensive analysis of PCC, as opposed
to the preliminary assessment we are offering here, one
should also scrutinize the extent to which today’s PCC
awareness-raising campaigns may be (co-opted as) mod-
ern-day heirs to entrenched community traditions in which
a girl’s identity is narrowly scripted as ‘future mother’ – a
script of social expectation and obligation that can be
enforced by playing to fears that if a girl or woman engages
in athletic pursuits, takes on stressful studies or employ-
ment, for example, she might be endangering her central
raison d’être: that of being a responsible ‘future mother’.
To be fair, men are also being asked to engage in certain
forms of PCC to optimize semen quality or to aid and
support (and, perhaps, to coax and keep compliant) their
female reproductive partner [13], yet overall their potential
PCC responsibilities pale in comparison to those ascribed
to women. PCC advocate Merry-K. Moos has engaged
with the worry that PCC might “frame women as nothing
more than vessels for growing healthy offspring” [9], andlargely dismisses it. Commentators such as Rebecca Kukla,
on the other hand, discuss the increasing and unreason-
able burdens women are expected to accept on their way
to becoming a mother [14]. In a similar vein, PCC is at
risk of being co-opted in dubious practices of “hyper-
parenting”, where competitive, perfectionist and over-
anxious parents seek to control and plan ahead the lives
of their (future) children to an ever increasing extent [15].
Messages entailing a substantial responsibility expansion
for potential parents can also come from the very different
corner of for-profit health care providers. For-profit entre-
preneurs have a marked commercial interest in inflating
notions of individual responsibility and fanning the flames
of hyper-parenting: the more that potential parents believe
themselves to be inadequate, and the more that people
consider themselves to be potential parents, the greater
the demand for the services of such entrepreneurs. In the
world of direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies
such as Counsyl and 23andMe, marketing techniques of
commercial demand creation in the guise of public-spirited
‘awareness-raising’ seem to be standard fare [16-18].
Thus, for example, Counsyl, the for-profit provider of
a highly media-hyped ‘Universal Test’ for genetic risk,
highlights on its website the following quote of Professor
Patrizio, director of the Yale Fertility Centre: “Every adult
of reproductive age should consider the Counsyl test
before pregnancy.” As Counsyl-CEO Srinivasan likes to
envision it, his company’s test should not only be ‘universal’
in its testing capacity but also in its use: “one of our
goals is to make this like the home pregnancy test”
[19]. Occasionally such messages are taken to hyperbolic
extremes. For instance, the director of the for-profit
Centre for Surrogate Parenting and leading US radio
host Bill Handel has opined that conceiving of a child
via coitus has today become offensively irresponsible: “I
always get astounded and offended when people actually
have sex to have kids. I don’t understand that. They
shouldn’t do that. You can always use some high-tech
form of reproduction” [20].
Not only do such for-profit actors often severely over-
state the moral obligation of potential parents to become
PCC customers, they also tend to severely overstate the
effectiveness of the services they market. Without proper
policies to mitigate misinformation and manipulative
‘demand creation’, the general public will often not be
able to distinguish between bona fide and not-so-bona
fide players in the PCC field [16]. As a result, they are at
risk of lumping all these responsibilizing messages to-
gether, thus creating a sense of PCC responsibility that is
needlessly cumbersome.
Nevertheless, though Handel’s suggestion is grossly
excessive given today’s state of the art, Savulescu and
Kahane have argued that “[a]s means of selection become
safer and our ability to use them to select non-disease
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beneficence] will require most reproducers to select the
most advantaged child unless doing so is predicted to lead
to a very significant loss of well-being to existing people”
[9:281]. This implies that, if assisted reproductive tech-
nologies would ever turn into full-blooded alternatives
that are significantly less risky than natural reproduction,
anyone who has access to such technologies would have
significant moral reason to relinquish natural procreation
altogether in order to reproduce in the safer, artificial way.
Whether or not one objects to this specific example,
the general point remains that simply by upholding the
very same moral standard that governs today’s use of
PCC, potential parents may find themselves morally
obliged to engage in quite unsettling acts and omissions
as PCC capabilities expand.Preconception nonmaleficence and the autonomy of
potential parents
We now turn to some arguments which seem to provide
legitimate, principled objections to the primacy of precon-
ception beneficence. If these objections hold, they would
relax the taxing demands of preconception beneficence
discussed earlier.
Insofar as a ‘potential parent’ falls beneath certain thresh-
olds of intent to cause conception and/or probability to
cause conception, it becomes problematic if not outright
incoherent to expect such a person to take up certain
presumed role responsibilities of a parent. Since she
would not fit the description of a parent or procreator,
it would make little sense to ask her to fulfil particular
parental or procreative duties. Indeed, to the extent that
potential parents would not be parents, other principles
can assert themselves, most importantly the principle
of individual autonomy. In principle, such ‘non-parents’
should be free to lead their lives without being excessively
constrained by concerns about the wellbeing of unintended
and merely potential children.
This is not to say, of course, that non-parents would
thereby be relieved of the general responsibility to avoid
inflicting harm upon others, a duty that stems from the
general principle of nonmaleficence [5]. This universal
duty to do no harm, which is codified in some form in
virtually all established moral theories as well as in civil
law, applies to non-parents and parents alike. However,
this universal duty of nonmaleficence obviously needs
curbing, lest one is (absurdly) held responsible for all
possible harm (no matter how minute) to anyone (no
matter how remote). In order to properly apply the
principle of nonmaleficence and to discern whether the
corresponding duty is at play in a given situation, further
stock concepts from moral philosophy and law need to
be brought in [21].For our purposes, it is sufficient to invoke the concepts of
reasonable foreseeability, adequate control, adequately prox-
imate causation, proportionality, and reasonable prudence:
1. Foreseeability (requiring adequate cognizance by the
wrongdoer of the consequences of his act or omission);
2. Control (requiring adequate control by the wrongdoer
over the events in which he was implicated);
3. Proximate causation (requiring that the act or
omission of the wrongdoer was an adequately
proximate cause of the adverse turn of events);
4. Proportionality (requiring that the benefits of the
intervention are in proportion to the effort that
must be invested to avoid the wrong). We will
consider proportionality in relation to the standard
of a ‘normal person of reasonable prudence’:
preconception acts and abstentions that are
disproportionately burdensome to such a person will
not be morally required. Normally proportionality is
calculated as follows: probability of an affliction in a
future child x gravity of the affliction/cost of
precaution. With regard to PCC, however, this
calculus – already difficult to apply in a sufficiently
precise and methodologically satisfactory way – is
further complicated by the fact that the calculus
must be made prior to conception, which can add
great uncertainty and because one has to factor in
the probability of conception, which is highly
unclear in most cases. Thus, the calculus to be
applied with regard to PCC takes the following
form: probability of conception x probability of
affliction x gravity of affliction/cost of precaution.
This added complexity alone has caused certain judges
to declare preconception torts inadmissible [21].
Applications: folic acid, obesity, genetic testing
In order to more precisely assess the responsibilities of
potential parents in specific cases of PCC, the general
conception of preconception responsibility outlined in
the previous section (‘Principles’) needs to be applied to
specific PCC interventions and specific types of potential
parents. In this section we will provide three brief casuistic
illustrations to put our general conception of preconcep-
tion responsibility to work: folic acid, obesity, and genetic
screening. We will highlight where and why preconception
responsibilities significantly increase or decrease between
different types of potential parents.
Folic acid
The potential suffering brought on by neural tube defects
such as the gravely adverse condition of spina bifida is
significant and the chance of such defects occurring is
1/1000 for American procreators [22]. A strong evidence
base has been established, indicating that the consumption
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months prior to conception, reduces by two thirds the
risk of neural tube defects [1].
Given the framework of preconception responsibility
outlined above, does this make it morally required for any
normal, reasonably prudent potential parent to begin
taking folic acid in due time?
Cognizance. One needs to be aware of the importance
and possibility of achieving an optimal folic acid intake in
order to be able to do so in a timely fashion. This requires
education via awareness-raising campaigns, timely advice
from GPs, obstetricians, etc. Unfortunately, even in coun-
tries such as The Netherlands, where efforts at widespread
informational campaigns on folic acid have been made,
many women remain unaware about the existence and
importance of folic acid [1]. As things stand, this can
hardly be blamed on a failure of these women to have
solicited proper and timely advice on preconception
care. This may surely change, however, once folic acid
intake becomes a standard fixture within public health
education.
Control. Provided that one has ready access to folic
acid (financial, logistic and otherwise; conditions that
may again not be met in many situations), the intake of
this supplement is quite feasible and does not seem to be
very demanding, neither as regards expenditure of money,
time, or effort, nor endurance of side-effects (optimizing
folic acid levels does not produce any negative side-effects
for the mother-to-be).
Causation. Should one forego folic acid intake, this
omission would become an important co-cause of (the
higher probability of ) eventual neural tube defects in
future offspring.
Proportionality. A normal prospective mother of reason-
able prudence can reasonably be expected to shoulder
the very minor burden of taking folic acid tablets, and
reproductive partners can equally be expected to support
and stimulate their child-bearing reproductive partners
to do so [13]. Even in the presence of multiple other
demands and given the daily hustle and bustle of every-
day life which can complicate proper compliance with
prescribed medical routines, this does not impose an
unreasonable or disproportionate burden.
Beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. Given
that prospective parents are already explicitly assuming
a parental role identity, they have special duties of pro-
creative beneficence towards their future child and should
first optimize their folic acid levels. Potential parents of
category 4 – sexually active but leaving possible con-
ception up to chance – also have an elevated moral duty.
They should either start using contraceptives or else
optimize their folic acid levels. Concerning potential
parents who use contraception, some PCC advocates
argue that the packages of birth control pills shouldadvise that upon stopping with birth control pills in
order to try to conceive, one should immediately switch to
folic acid supplements [1]. On our analysis, such initiatives
are warranted. Moreover, this advice could be broadened
to include the information that, given the high incidence
rates of unplanned pregnancy, any (presumably) fertile
and sexually active woman (i.e. not only those in category
5 but also those in categories 4 and 3) should consider
optimizing her folic acid level to decrease the risk of
neural tube defects. Persons in the other categories are so
far removed from a potential conception that they have no
duty of preconception beneficence to take folic acid.
Obesity
The potential adverse pregnancy outcomes brought on
by conception and gestation in an overweight body can
be severe (increasingly so as one moves towards actual
(morbid) obesity). Paraphrasing the synopsis of several
systematic reviews provided by the Health Council of
The Netherlands [1], compared to women of normal
weight (BMI between 20 and 25), for obese women
(BMI 30<) the risk of diabetes is increased by a factor of
1.4 to 20, the risk of hypertension by 2.2 to 21.4, and the
risk of pre-eclampsia by 1.2 to 9.7. These factors increase
the risk of harming the foetus, making the incidence of
neural tube defects rise by a factor of 1.5 to 3.0 times in
children of obese mothers and the risk of stillbirth by a
factor of 2.5 to 3.4. These risks are also elevated, albeit to
a lesser degree, for overweight persons (BMI 25–30). A
clear solution to reduce these risks would be the timely
optimization of one’s body weight.
Given the framework of preconception responsibility
outlined above, should any normal, reasonably prudent
potential parent normalize her body weight before attempt-
ing pregnancy or if there is a risk of an unplanned
pregnancy?
Cognizance. In contrast to public knowledge on folic
acid, it is widely known that abnormally high body weight
is related to a host of health problems. However, the link
between body weight and health problems of potential
future offspring is likely to be substantially less well-
known. For instance, without scientific knowledge on the
issue, some might even speculate that being overweight
may provide a better, more nurturing conceptive and
gestational environment.
Control. Reducing and/or substantially changing the
nature of one’s food intake can be very demanding to
many people, for reasons of individual psychology, group
psychology, (financial) access to healthy food, etc. It will
often require a trying expenditure of time, effort and
possibly money. In some cases, problematic body weight
is not (or not primarily) the result of one’s behaviour, but a
largely inescapable outcome of a genetic constitution, a
medical condition, or a medication regime. Case by case,
Bonte et al. BMC Medical Ethics 2014, 15:5 Page 8 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/15/5and risk group by risk group, these factors should be taken
into account in the calculus of personal responsibility.
That said, many overweight persons are in a position to
optimize their body weight.
Causation. Being overweight prior to conception can
causally contribute to several forms of adverse pregnancy
outcomes [1]. To the extent that it is the overweight
persons’ acts and/or omissions that causally brought about
their risk-increasing body weight, they open themselves
up to being held morally accountable for exposing their
potential child to the attendant risks. However, consider-
ations of proportionality might substantially relax, if not
absolve them of, such moral accountability.
Proportionality. For several reasons, it would be prob-
lematic to make the moral demand on overweight
potential parents to suspend all attempts at conception
until they have successfully optimized their weight. For
instance, the weight-optimizing enterprise might take
so much time for certain persons that, by the time they
reach an optimal weight, other obstacles have come
into play (e.g. maternal age over 35, loss of a willing
reproductive partner, etc.). Moreover, persons burdened
by a relative lack of financial resources or by certain
genetic or medical conditions may find it virtually im-
possible to optimize their body weight, or doing so may
be disproportionally difficult for them. Therefore, it
would be problematic to demand compliance. Rather,
only a proportionate, sustained effort to optimize one’s
weight can reasonably be demanded [23]. Although fertile
persons with weight problems could disregard all directive
messages and simply go ahead and conceive, that would
constitute a (legally permissible yet) morally tainted
exercise of their reproductive liberty.
Beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. Prospect-
ive parents, already having a future child in view, would
also need to invest such effort out of their duty of procre-
ative beneficence. For potential parents of category 4,
who are leaving it up to chance if they get pregnant/
impregnate, a heightened moral imperative to keep their
body weight under control also holds. Considering the
fact that tackling overweight will often be a much more
demanding task than taking folic acid, other types of
potential parents – who have only a lesser or no duty of
beneficence – should only be non-directively informed
about the risks to future children of preconception over-
weight, for, in view of the demandingness, the proportion-
ality calculus would allow more leeway to the potential
parents’ lifestyle choices or habits over their duty of
non-maleficence.
Genetic screening
A great number of diseases and handicaps are rooted in
one’s genetic make-up. Increasingly, potential parents
can find out whether they are carriers of genetic factorsthat significantly increase the probability of adverse
pregnancy outcomes, most commonly for autosomal
dominant or autosomal recessive disorders, for which
there is, respectively, a ½ or ¼ chance of producing the
disorder in one’s offspring.
Given the framework of preconception responsibility
outlined above, should any normal, reasonably prudent
potential parent undergo genetic screening before attempt-
ing to conceive?
Cognizance. Basic knowledge about genetic risks
clearly remains an issue about which more public health
education is needed [24]. The same holds a fortiori for
the additional awareness that genetic screening prior to
conception is available and might be helpful. However,
public knowledge levels on these issues seem likely to
increase given the emergence of public campaigns on
PCC and on genetic literacy, as well as the publicity cam-
paigns by commercial (quasi-)direct-to-consumer genetic
testing companies.
Control. The Health Council of The Netherlands argues
that “the scenario must be avoided in which a decision not
to make use of a service such as preconceptual carrier
screening is regarded as irresponsible”, based in part on
the consideration that one’s genetic constitution is not a
‘controllable’ factor in the sense that for instance one’s
overweight or one’s folic acid level are ‘controllable’ [1].
However, even though one cannot exercise any meaning-
ful control over one’s genetic constitution, in many cases
one can exercise meaningful control over how one will
expose one’s future offspring to risks stemming from it.
Causation. Though one is not oneself the cause of
one’s genetic constitution and thus must surely not be
blamed or in any way judged for it, one can become the
cause of an adverse condition in one’s offspring due to
one’s unwillingness to undertake genetic screening.
Proportionality. How should we map the benefit/burden
calculus for genetic screening? On the benefit side, the
amount of suffering one can avoid is significant, as
shown for instance by the Cypriot campaign against
beta-thalassemia [25]. Equally, the degree of certainty
that one will effectively avoid significant suffering can
often be high, for instance when one has been diagnosed
with a dominant or recessive autosomal disorder, or when
one is a member of a population with an elevated risk, e.g.
1 in 30 Dutch persons is a carrier of cystic fibrosis [1]. On
the burden side, undergoing genetic carrier screening
demands very little of a potential parent: providing a
blood or sputum sample or even only a buccal swab.
The burdens rather lie in handling knowledge regarding
one’s genetic status (which may reveal much more than
just the risks for one’s future offspring, namely risks to
oneself and to one’s genetic relatives). To avoid such
burdens, one may want to invoke a ‘right not to know’.
Another set of substantial burdens pertains to the
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in when a substantial genetic risk has been found (e.g.
the strains of undergoing IVF/PGD cycles). Moreover,
in regions without publicly subsidized health care for
these purposes, both the testing itself and the ensuing
interventions can be extremely costly for potential parents.
Then again, when one takes into account the potentially
astronomical costs to a person of living with a severe
affliction, plus the costs of (lifelong) care for severely
afflicted persons, even high costs of tests and interventions
may nonetheless be relatively proportionate. A normal
and reasonably prudent prospective parent (i.e. category
5), who has good reason to assume that he/she belongs to
a group with an elevated genetic risk of severely afflicting
future offspring, would be acting morally irresponsibly if
he/she knowingly foregoes genetic carrier screening.
Beneficence, non-maleficence and autonomy. In Cyprus,
persons who want to marry before the Cypriot Orthodox
Church (and who can be reasonably expected to try to
bear children) are obliged to first have their carrier status
for beta-thalassemia checked [25]. On our analysis, such a
scheme seems to be based on a proper conception of
preconception beneficence. All prospective parents (i.e.
those in category 5) whose genetic predicament is known
to be analogous to that of the Cypriots can reasonably
be expected to engage in genetic screening for their
respective risk factors. In another scheme proposed by
the UK Human Genetics Commission, population-wide
genetic screening for a variety of genetic risks would be
organized during the final years of the secondary education
system [4]. According to this proposal, adolescents should
be merely informed in an entirely non-directive way of
the possibility of being screened and about what screening
can achieve. One might argue that a large-scale implemen-
tation of genetic screening would inadvertently give rise
to some implicit directivity. Yet on our analysis, within
proper bounds, such awareness-raising concerning the
preconception responsibilities of potential parents in
categories 1, 2, 3, and certainly 4, may be justified. For
instance, to those in categories 1 and 2, one could already
mention the moral importance of avoiding severe afflictions
in one’s future children, and leave it to their own discretion
to think about the (dis)proportionality of preemptively
investigating their genetic risk factors. For potential
parents in category 3 and certainly to those in category
4, one could both heighten awareness of the likelihood
of unplanned pregnancy and signal the importance (made
more acute in view of their coital activity) of getting to
know their genetic risk profiles. A similar conclusion
can be reached starting from a discussion of reproductive
autonomy [26]. It must be noted, however, that none of
this would compromise the right of a potential parent to
conscientiously object, their right to exercise the right not
to know, or their right to reproduce.Summary
We began this paper by briefly sketching the state of
the art and the state of the debate regarding PCC. We
explained how the PCC paradigm can enlist all sorts of
‘potential parents’ in its preventative project by imposing
some form of preconception responsibility upon all of
them. This identification of large swathes of society as
some kind of potential parent seems to entail a real risk of
a ‘responsibility explosion’. If one maps these categories
out on the lifespan of a single person, most people would
have to assume at least some minimal form of PCC
responsibility during their entire period of fertility.
This situation seems to be further aggravated by the
increasing number of PCC measures that are becoming
available and by the ‘capability imperative’ they inevitably
bring about. Given these substantial burdens, we have
attempted to develop a preliminary framework of pre-
conception responsibility that identifies preconception
responsibilities in a sufficiently specific way. To that end,
we have applied a theory of moral responsibility, involving
principles of (preconception) beneficence, (preconception)
non-maleficence and individual autonomy, to the cases of
folic acid, obesity and genetic screening.
Our discussion of PCC has been primarily restricted
to potential parents. Further work, seeking to develop a
comprehensive rather than a preliminary ethical framing
of PCC such as the one offered here, needs to take into
account much broader socio-political realities and nor-
mative frameworks. Indeed, an in-depth analysis would
also need to investigate the PCC responsibilities of medical
professionals, health care institutions, the potential parent’s
government, employer, and cultural, social and family
communities. Our focus on potential parents is by no
means intended to detract from the responsibilities of
the other actors and institutions in the field of PCC.
We have argued that prospective parents as well as
several other categories of potential parents have at least
a minimal moral duty to sufficiently try to optimize the
circumstances of conception. Although we have sought
to apply only a ‘minimal’ standard (i.e. one that prescribes
a ‘moral minimum’), circumstances may conspire to make
the commitment to only ‘minimal’ duties of PCC overly
burdensome nonetheless. That would be a sufficient
reason to reject even some of such ‘minimal’ duties. It
would certainly be absurd to argue that an agent X has a
duty Y, if X is irremediably incapable of meeting duty Y.
Similarly, it would be unreasonable to expect from poten-
tial parents that they perform supererogatory acts of PCC.
There are many cases in which realizing one’s basic
moral duties in no more than a minimally sufficient way
may in practice require sustained attentiveness over a
long period of time, as well as intensive effort and
substantial sacrifice of self-centred activity. The current
armoury of PCC has not yet amassed to such a dramatic
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would require the use of artificial reproductive technolo-
gies as Bill Handel would have it – indeed it seems
highly doubtful that such a scenario would ever come
about. Nevertheless, it will probably already be hard for
many people today to adequately discharge themselves
of the minimal PCC duties advocated here. The strains
involved will only increase as new effective means of
PCC interventions are made available. The strains them-
selves, however, should not be invoked as an argument
against PCC, as long as a normal potential parent of
reasonable prudence can be expected to bear such strains
in order to reduce the likelihood of serious adverse
pregnancy outcomes.
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